Keyword: Argument

Dictionary Entry | Posted 13/03/2018
Quote from "P of L"

An argument is a sign whose proper interpretant represents it as a sign. In order that the proper interpretant may do this, the argument must have separate...

Dictionary Entry | Posted 09/03/2018
Quote from "Minute Logic: Chapter I. Intended Characters of this Treatise"

An Argument is a Sign which aims to determine a definite Interpretant, called its Conclusion. It must, a fortiori, have a definite subject.

Dictionary Entry | Posted 05/03/2018
Quote from "On Existential Graphs"

An argument is a bad name for a symbol in which the representative element, or reason, is distinctly expressed. It may be used either to produce belief or...

Article in Journal | Posted 14/09/2017
O'Neill, L. J. (1998). Aspects of Peirce's Theory of Inference
Dictionary Entry | Posted 21/08/2017
Quote from "Foundations of Mathematics [R]"

A sign is also intended to determine, in a mind or elsewhere, a sign of the same object; and this interpretant of the sign may be the very sign itself; but as a general rule it will be...

Article in Journal | Posted 17/08/2017
Bellucci, Francesco (2014). “Logic, considered as Semeiotic”: On Peirce's Philosophy of Logic
In his later years, Peirce devoted much energy to the project of a book on logic, whose intended title was “Logic, considered as Semeiotic.” That the science of logic is better considered as...
Dictionary Entry | Posted 14/08/2017
Quote from "Reason's Rules"

an argument is a communication by which the arguer endeavours to produce a predetermined belief in the mind he addresses.

Dictionary Entry | Posted 10/08/2017
Quote from "Definitions for Baldwin's Dictionary [R]"

An argument may be defined as a symbol which definitely and separately shows what interpretant, or conclusion, it aims at.

Dictionary Entry | Posted 13/10/2015
Quote from "Notes on Portions of Hume's "Treatise on Human Nature""

In their relations to their Triadic, i.e. intended or adaptational Interpretants, Signs may, 1st, determine those interpretants, merely in the sense that, if the Interpretants represent...

Dictionary Entry | Posted 13/01/2015
Quote from "Logical Tracts. No. 1. On Existential Graphs"

An argument is a symbol which specially shows what interpretant it is intended to determine

Dictionary Entry | Posted 12/01/2015
Quote from "Notes on Topical Geometry"

Symbols are of three classes: terms, which call attention to things or quasi-things; propositions, which declare facts; and arguments, which...

Manuscript | Posted 12/01/2015
Peirce, Charles S. (1899-1900 [c.]). Notes on Topical Geometry. MS [R] 142

A. MS., G-undated-16 [c.1899-1900?], 6 pp., plus 2 pp. each of two other drafts having the same title as above.
Published, in part, as 8.368n23. Omitted from publication are definitions of “...

Manuscript | Posted 26/11/2014
Peirce, Charles S. (1909). Meaning Preface. MS [R] 637

Robin Catalogue:
A. MS., n.p., October 3-13, 1909, pp. 9-36, 27-30, 28-29, 31-36.
Tendency to guess right (but not necessarily on the first guess). Pure logic supports the...

Manuscript | Posted 12/09/2014
Peirce, Charles S. (1905-07 [c.]). On the theory of Collections and Multitude. MS [R] 31

Robin Catalogue:
A. MS., n.p., [c.1905-07?], 2 pp.; plus 1 p. (p. 2) (“Note on Collections”).

Manuscript | Posted 01/09/2014
Peirce, Charles S. (1904). Foundations of Mathematics [R]. MS [R] 9

A. MS., n.p. [c.1903?], pp. 1-5, with rejected pages. Vagueness, generality, and singularity.

Manuscript | Posted 01/09/2014
Peirce, Charles S. (1904). On the Foundations of Mathematics. MS [R] 8

Robin Catalogue:
A. MS., n.p., [c.1903?], pp. 1-4, 3-4; 4-8 of another draft.

Manuscript | Posted 31/08/2014
Peirce, Charles S. (1904). On the Foundations of Mathematics. MS [R] 7

Robin Catalogue:
A. MS., n.p., [c.1903?], pp. 1-16, with 3 rejected pages; 17-19 of another draft.
Mathematics as dealing essentially with signs. The MSS. below (Nos. 8-11) are...

Dictionary Entry | Posted 26/05/2014
Quote from "A Logical Critique of Essential Articles of Religious Faith"

An argument […] is nearly equivalent to “premiss” or “copulate premiss,” i.e. a body of premisses having a single intention, and is a known or pretended fact which is...

Dictionary Entry | Posted 18/08/2013
Quote from "Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism: Lecture V"

A representamen is either a rhema, a proposition, or an argument. An argument is a representamen which separately shows what...

Dictionary Entry | Posted 25/04/2013
Quote from "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism"

A familiar logical triplet is Term, Proposition, Argument. In order to make this a division of all signs, the first two members have to be much widened. [—] As the third member of the triplet, I...