Symbol

Keyword: Symbol


Dictionary Entry | Posted 20/09/2017
Quote from "Meaning Preface"

The word “Symbol” will in this book be used as the common name for that class of Signs which represent, to those that can interpret them, the objects they do quite...

Dictionary Entry | Posted 10/08/2017
Quote from "Definitions for Baldwin's Dictionary [R]"

A symbol is a representamen which refers only to such objects and in such respects as it might determine an interpretant to refer to those objects in those respects, and is...

Article in Journal | Posted 21/01/2016
de Villiers, Tanya (2007). Why Peirce Matters: The Symbol in Deacon's Symbolic Species
Article in Edited Collection | Posted 18/01/2016
De Tienne, André (1989). Peirce's Early Semiotic Analysis of Representation. In: Semiotics 1988
Dictionary Entry | Posted 19/11/2015
Quote from "On the Foundations of Mathematics"

A third kind of sign, which brings the reference to an interpretant into prominence[,] is one which is fit to be a sign, not at all because of any particular analogy with...

Dictionary Entry | Posted 16/11/2015
Quote from "New Elements (Kaina stoiceia)"

…the most characteristic aspect of a symbol is its aspect as related to its interpretant; because a symbol is distinguished as a sign which becomes such by virtue of...

Dictionary Entry | Posted 13/10/2015
Quote from "Notes on Portions of Hume's "Treatise on Human Nature""

In their relation to their Dyadic Objects, Signs are, 1st, those which refer to their objects by virtue of their independent possession of some character of those objects, as a figure...

Dictionary Entry | Posted 13/10/2015
Quote from "Notes on Portions of Hume's "Treatise on Human Nature""

by a symbol I mean a sign which represents its object only by virtue of the fact that it will be interpreted as doing so.

Article in Journal | Posted 06/10/2015
Bellucci, Francesco (2015). Neat, Swine, Sheep, and Deer: Mill and Peirce on Natural Kinds
In the earliest phase of his logical investigations (1865–1870), Peirce adopts Mill's doctrine of real Kinds as discussed in the System of Logic and adapts it to the logical conceptions he was...
Dictionary Entry | Posted 19/01/2015
Quote from "Reason's Rules"

A Symbol […] represents its object solely by virtue of being represented to represent it by the interpretant which it determines.

Manuscript | Posted 19/01/2015
Peirce, Charles S. (1902 [c.]). Reason's Rules. MS [R] 599

Robin Catalogue:
A. MS., n.p., [c.1902], pp. 4-45, 31-42, and 8 pp. of fragments.
The nature of a sign. Propositions as the significations of signs which represent that some...

Dictionary Entry | Posted 15/01/2015
Quote from "Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, and the Reducibility of Fourthness [R]"

…a sign may, in its secondness to the object as represented, [—] either, as an ‘Icon,’ be related to that object by virtue of a character which belongs to the sign in its own firstness, and which...

Manuscript | Posted 15/01/2015
Peirce, Charles S. (1904). Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, and the Reducibility of Fourthness [R]. MS [R] 914

Robin Catalogue:
A. MS., n.p., n.d., pp. 5-8.
The nature of signs.

Dictionary Entry | Posted 13/01/2015
Quote from "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God (G)"

[Symbols are] signs which represent their objects simply because they will be so understood, or arbitrary signs. [—] The denotation of a symbol is always definitely...

Dictionary Entry | Posted 13/01/2015
Quote from "Meaning Preface"

…the mode of representation may be by likeness or analogy, in which case, the sign may be called an Icon; or it may be by a real connexion, as a certain kind of rapid pulse is symptom of...

Dictionary Entry | Posted 13/01/2015
Quote from "Logical Tracts. No. 1. On Existential Graphs"

A symbol is a representamen whose representative force depends on how it is interpreted.
This sounds like nonsense; for what else is the...

Dictionary Entry | Posted 12/01/2015
Quote from "Notes on Topical Geometry"

Signs are of three kinds,

1st, the icon, which represents its object by virtue of a character which it would equally possess did the object and the interpreting mind not exist;...

Manuscript | Posted 12/01/2015
Peirce, Charles S. (1899-1900 [c.]). Notes on Topical Geometry. MS [R] 142

A. MS., G-undated-16 [c.1899-1900?], 6 pp., plus 2 pp. each of two other drafts having the same title as above.
Published, in part, as 8.368n23. Omitted from publication are definitions of “...

Article in Journal | Posted 29/11/2014
Goethals, Patrick (2010). A multi-layered approach to speech events: the case of Spanish justificational conjunctions
I will describe the structural and semantic characteristics of the Spanish causal conjunctions como (as, since), ya que (as, since), and pues (for). I will argue that, unlike predicative causal...
Manuscript | Posted 26/11/2014
Peirce, Charles S. (1909). Meaning Preface. MS [R] 637

Robin Catalogue:
A. MS., n.p., October 3-13, 1909, pp. 9-36, 27-30, 28-29, 31-36.
Tendency to guess right (but not necessarily on the first guess). Pure logic supports the...

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