Commens
Digital Companion to C. S. Peirce
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1897 | The Logic of Relatives | CP 3.535

a dyadic relation […] is nothing but an aggregation of pairs. Now any two hecceities may in either order form a pair; and any aggregate whatever of such pairs will form some dyadic relation. Hence, we may totally disregard the manner in which the hecceities are connected in determining the possibility of a hypothesis about some dyadic relation.

1897 [c.] | Recreations in Reasoning | CP 4.154

A fact true of a pair of subjects […] is a “dyadic relation.”

1897 [c.] | On Multitude | MS [R] 26:8

A dyadic relation is a predicate of an ordered pair of subjects, of which one, the grammatical subject, is called the relate, and the other, the grammatical object[,] is called the correlate.

1902 | Logic (exact) | DPP 2:27; CP 3.625

Dyadic relation. A fact relating to two individuals. Thus, the fact that A is similar to B, and the fact that A is a lover of B, and the fact that A and B are both men, are dyadic relations; while the fact that A gives B to C is a triadic relation. Every relation of one order of relativity may be regarded as a relative of another order of relativity if desired. Thus, man may be regarded as man coexistent with, and so as a relative expressing a dyadic relation, although for most purposes it will be regarded as a monad or non-relative term.

1903 | Nomenclature and Divisions of Dyadic Relations | CP 3.571-572

A dyadic relation is a character whose being consists in the logical possibility of a definite fact concerning an ordered pair, or dyad, of subjects; the first of these being termed the relate, the second the correlate; and the relation is said to subsist between the relate and correlate when the fact in whose possibility its being consists actually has place between these objects. The relation, by itself, is, therefore, an ens rationis and mere logical possibility; but its subsistence is of the nature of a fact. [—]

The broadest division of dyadic relations is into those which can only subsist between two subjects of different categories of being (as between an existing individual and a quality) and those which can subsist between two subjects of the same category. A relation of the former kind may advantageously be termed a reference; a relation of the latter kind, a dyadic relation proper.

1905-07 [c.] | Considerations concerning the Doctrine of Multitude | MS [R] 27:5

A dyadic relation is a genaral character of dyads, or ordered pairs. [—] A genuine dyadic relation is one which does not consist in the two members of any dyad between which it subsists having certain qualities.

1912 | Notes Preparatory to a Criticism of Bertrand Russell's Principles of Mathematics | MS [R] 12:5

By a “dyadic relation” I mean a predicate applicable to two subjects, usually independent.