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# Bibliography

On the System of Existential Graphs Considered as an Instrument for the Investigation of Logic

## Htabs

Type:

Manuscript

Title:

On the System of Existential Graphs Considered as an Instrument for the Investigation of Logic

Id:

MS [R] 499

Year:

1906 [c.]

Description:

**Robin Catalogue:**

A. MS., notebook (Harvard Cooperative), n.p., n.d.

The value of logical algebras. Logic as a calculus: CSP’s minority report. The way in which the system of existential graphs serves the interest of the science of logic. Solutions suggested by the method of existential graphs to two problems, one of which concerns the relation of signs to minds and the other the composition of concepts. Existential relations of signs, from which is deduced a classification of signs and a nomenclature useful in describing existential graphs.

Keywords:

Language:

English

*On the System of Existential Graphs Considered as an Instrument for the Investigation of Logic*. MS [R] 499.

The entry in BibTeX format.

author = "Charles S. Peirce",

title = "{On the System of Existential Graphs Considered as an Instrument for the Investigation of Logic. MS [R] 499}",

year = 1906 [c.],

abstract = "{Robin Catalogue: A. MS., notebook (Harvard Cooperative), n.p., n.d. The value of logical algebras. Logic as a calculus: CSP’s minority report. The way in which the system of existential graphs serves the interest of the science of logic. Solutions suggested by the method of existential graphs to two problems, one of which concerns the relation of signs to minds and the other the composition of concepts. Existential relations of signs, from which is deduced a classification of signs and a nomenclature useful in describing existential graphs. }",

keywords = "Logic, Existential Graph, Peano, Bertrand Russell, Alfred North Whitehead, Science, Heuretic Science, Semeiotic, Classification of Signs",

language = "English",

note = "From the Commens Bibliography | \url{http://www.commens.org/bibliography/manuscript/peirce-charles-s-1906-c-system-existential-graphs-considered-instrument}"

}

title = "{On the System of Existential Graphs Considered as an Instrument for the Investigation of Logic. MS [R] 499}",

year = 1906 [c.],

abstract = "{Robin Catalogue: A. MS., notebook (Harvard Cooperative), n.p., n.d. The value of logical algebras. Logic as a calculus: CSP’s minority report. The way in which the system of existential graphs serves the interest of the science of logic. Solutions suggested by the method of existential graphs to two problems, one of which concerns the relation of signs to minds and the other the composition of concepts. Existential relations of signs, from which is deduced a classification of signs and a nomenclature useful in describing existential graphs. }",

keywords = "Logic, Existential Graph, Peano, Bertrand Russell, Alfred North Whitehead, Science, Heuretic Science, Semeiotic, Classification of Signs",

language = "English",

note = "From the Commens Bibliography | \url{http://www.commens.org/bibliography/manuscript/peirce-charles-s-1906-c-system-existential-graphs-considered-instrument}"

}

Commens Dictionary entries from ‘On the System of Existential Graphs Considered as an Instrument for the Investigation of Logic’

1906 [c.] | MS [R] 499
A calculus […] is a system of symbols by transforming which according to a certain routine one is enabled to pass from a premiss to a conclusion in a particularly speedy and direct way. |

1906 [c.] | MS [R] 499
…I must explain in what sense I speak of a “science”, – which is an abridged expression for a heuretic science, or science aiming at the discovery of new truth. Namely, I do not mean by science, as the ancients did, that doctrine which is beyond all doubt. Nor do I use the word in the sense in which Coleridge at the beginning of the XIX |

1906 [c.] | MS [R] 499
…I must explain in what sense I speak of a “science”, – which is an abridged expression for a heuretic science, or science aiming at the discovery of new truth. Namely, I do not mean by science, as the ancients did, that doctrine which is beyond all doubt. Nor do I use the word in the sense in which Coleridge at the beginning of the XIX |

1906 [c.] | MS [R] 499
…it will be necessary for the present and for a long time to come to regard logic, not as a distinct science, but as only a department of the science of the general constitution of signs, – the physiology of signs, cenoscopic semeiotics. For it we roughly define a sign as a medium of communication, a piece of concerted music is a sign, and so is a word or signal of command. Now logic has no positive concern with either of these kinds of signs, but it must concern itself with them negatively in defining the kind of signs it does deal with; and it is not likely that in our time there will be anybody to study the general physiology of the nonlogical signs except the logician, who is obliged to do so, in some measure. |

1906 [c.] | MS [R] 499
…the science of the general constitution of signs, – the physiology of signs, cenoscopic semeiotics. |

1906 [c.] | MS [R] 499
…assertion does not add a new element of thought. For an assertion is not a thought but a deed. If one goes before a notary and takes one’s affidavit to a statement, that is nothing but highly emphatic assertion. |

1906 [c.] | MS [R] 499
…a sign is a something which is on the one hand caused or otherwise determined by something else which is not utterly and altogether unreal, – this something else being the object of the sign. When I say that the object is not altogether unreal, I mean this. If a thing has whatever characters it has utterly regardless of what any men existing either now or at any assignable future date may opine that its characters are, that thing is, by definition, perfectly real. But in so far as it is whatever the thinker may think it to be, it is unreal. Now I say that the object of a sign must resist in some measure any tendency it may have to be as the thinker thinks it. [—] The object is the sign’s |

1906 [c.] | MS [R] 499
…a sign is a something which is on the one hand caused or otherwise determined by something else which is not utterly and altogether unreal, – this something else being the object of the sign. [—] But a sign is not only on the one hand determined by a more or less real object but on the other hand it determines something, – which I call its The object is the sign’s |

1906 [c.] | MS [R] 499
…a sign is not only on the one hand determined by a more or less real object but on the other hand it determines something, – which I call its The object is the sign’s |