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# Bibliography

Lowell Lectures on Some Topics of Logic Bearing on Questions Now Vexed. C. S. Peirce's Lowell lnstitute Lectures. 1903, Seventh Lecture. Introduction Vol. I

## Htabs

Type:

Manuscript

Title:

Lowell Lectures on Some Topics of Logic Bearing on Questions Now Vexed. C. S. Peirce's Lowell lnstitute Lectures. 1903, Seventh Lecture. Introduction Vol. I

Id:

MS [R] 473

Year:

1903

Description:

**From the Robin Catalogue:**

A. MS., notebook, G-1903-2a, pp. 2-92.

Published, in part, as 7.110-130 (pp. 36-84). Omitted from publication: a discussion of deduction, induction, and abduction (pp. 2-35). The rationale of induction; Ockhamists versus Scotists; John Stuart Mill and the question of the uniformity of nature (pp. 85-92).

Keywords:

Continuity, Induction, Abduction, Deduction, Primum Cognitum, Logic, Experiment, Observation, Quasi-experimentation, Proposition, Probable Induction, Probable Deduction, General, Rudimentary Induction, Statistical Induction, Random Selection, Uniformity, John Stuart Mill, Ochamism, Scotism, Duns Scotus, Uniformity of Nature

Published in:

Language:

English

*Lowell Lectures on Some Topics of Logic Bearing on Questions Now Vexed. C. S. Peirce's Lowell lnstitute Lectures. 1903, Seventh Lecture. Introduction Vol. I*. MS [R] 473.

The entry in BibTeX format.

author = "Charles S. Peirce",

title = "{Lowell Lectures on Some Topics of Logic Bearing on Questions Now Vexed. C. S. Peirce's Lowell lnstitute Lectures. 1903, Seventh Lecture. Introduction Vol. I. MS [R] 473}",

year = 1903,

abstract = "{From the Robin Catalogue: A. MS., notebook, G-1903-2a, pp. 2-92. Published, in part, as 7.110-130 (pp. 36-84). Omitted from publication: a discussion of deduction, induction, and abduction (pp. 2-35). The rationale of induction; Ockhamists versus Scotists; John Stuart Mill and the question of the uniformity of nature (pp. 85-92). }",

keywords = "Continuity, Induction, Abduction, Deduction, Primum Cognitum, Logic, Experiment, Observation, Quasi-experimentation, Proposition, Probable Induction, Probable Deduction, General, Rudimentary Induction, Statistical Induction, Random Selection, Uniformity, John Stuart Mill, Ochamism, Scotism, Duns Scotus, Uniformity of Nature",

language = "English",

note = "From the Commens Bibliography | \url{http://www.commens.org/bibliography/manuscript/peirce-charles-s-1903-lowell-lectures-some-topics-logic-bearing-questions-2}"

}

title = "{Lowell Lectures on Some Topics of Logic Bearing on Questions Now Vexed. C. S. Peirce's Lowell lnstitute Lectures. 1903, Seventh Lecture. Introduction Vol. I. MS [R] 473}",

year = 1903,

abstract = "{From the Robin Catalogue: A. MS., notebook, G-1903-2a, pp. 2-92. Published, in part, as 7.110-130 (pp. 36-84). Omitted from publication: a discussion of deduction, induction, and abduction (pp. 2-35). The rationale of induction; Ockhamists versus Scotists; John Stuart Mill and the question of the uniformity of nature (pp. 85-92). }",

keywords = "Continuity, Induction, Abduction, Deduction, Primum Cognitum, Logic, Experiment, Observation, Quasi-experimentation, Proposition, Probable Induction, Probable Deduction, General, Rudimentary Induction, Statistical Induction, Random Selection, Uniformity, John Stuart Mill, Ochamism, Scotism, Duns Scotus, Uniformity of Nature",

language = "English",

note = "From the Commens Bibliography | \url{http://www.commens.org/bibliography/manuscript/peirce-charles-s-1903-lowell-lectures-some-topics-logic-bearing-questions-2}"

}

Commens Dictionary entries from ‘Lowell Lectures on Some Topics of Logic Bearing on Questions Now Vexed. C. S. Peirce’s Lowell lnstitute Lectures. 1903, Seventh Lecture. Introduction Vol. I’

1903 | CP 7.110-120
Suppose we define Inductive reasoning as that reasoning whose conclusion is justified not by there being any necessity of its being true or approximately true but by its being the result of a method which if steadily persisted in must bring the reasoner to the truth of the matter or must cause his conclusion in its changes to converge to the truth as its limit. Adopting this definition, I find that there are three orders of induction of very different degrees of cogency although they are all three indispensable. The first order of induction, which I will call The second order of induction consists in the argument from the fulfillment of predictions. [—] [—] The third order of induction, which may be called Statistical Induction, differs entirely from the other two in that it assigns a definite value to a quantity. It draws a sample of a class, finds a numerical expression for a predesignate character of that sample and extends this evaluation, under proper qualification, to the entire class, by the aid of the doctrine of chances. The doctrine of chances is, in itself, purely deductive. It draws necessary conclusions only. The third order of induction takes advantage of the information thus deduced to render induction exact. |