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Lecture I [R]

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Record

Type:

Manuscript

Author:

Peirce, Charles Sanders

Title:

Lecture I [R]

Id:

MS [R] 449

Year:

1903

Description:

Robin Catalogue:
A. MS., notebook, G-1903-2a, pp. 37-61.
Published, in part, as 1.611-615 and 8.176 (except 176n3) (pp. 37-49 and 51-53). Unpublished: criticism of Sigwart and the notion of “logisches Gefühl.” Logic embraces methodeutic, critic, and the doctrine of signs (speculative grammar), with the ultimate purpose of the logician being the working out of a theory regarding the advancement of knowledge. Speculative grammar is neither psychology nor epistemology. Erkenntnislehre is mainly metaphysics. CSP agrees with those metaphysicians who insist that metaphysics must rest upon logic.

Essential Peirce, vol. 2:
Composed at the end of the summer 1903 and delivered on 23 November 1903, this is the first of eight lectures Peirce gave at the Lowell Institute in Boston under the general title “Some Topics of Logic bearing on Questions now Vexed. ‘1 In this lecture, Peirce refutes “a malady” that “has broken out in science,” namely the idea then in vogue that rationality rests on a feeling of logicality, and that it is futile to try to find an objective distinction between good and bad reasoning. On the contrary, Peirce claims, that distinction is not at all a matter of what we approve of, but is a question of fact. Good reasoning is based on a method that “tends to carry us toward the truth more speedily than we could otherwise progress.” Peirce discusses the significance of even a slight tendency to guess correctly, arguing that, given the right method, that is all that is required to assure progress toward the truth. He continues the argument, just made in the Harvard Lectures, that reasoning is a form of controlled conduct, and thus has an ethical dimension. Peirce concludes with a discussion of the scope of logic, which he now equates with semiotics as a whole.

Keywords:

Right Reasoning, Ultimate Aim, Ideal, Reason, Feeling of Logicality, Growth, Victoria Lady Welby, Meaning, Grades of Meaning, Methodeutic, Advancement of Knowledge, Critic, Logic, Epistemology, Speculative Grammar, Quasi-sign, Hardness

Published in:

• EP 2: The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 2 (1893-1913) (252-257)

EP 2 combines MS [R] 448 and MS [R] 449 as 'What Makes a Reasoning Sound?' (ch. 17).

• CP 1: The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol. I: The Principles of Philosophy (611-615)

• CP 8: The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol. VIII: Reviews, Correspondence, and Bibliography (176)

Language:

English

Posted:

Sep 22, 2014, 18:03 by Mats Bergman

Last revised:

Mar 18, 2018, 12:07 by Mats Bergman

APA

Peirce, C. S. (1903). Lecture I [R]. MS [R] 449.

BibTeX

The entry in BibTeX format.

@unpublished{Peirce1903,

author = "Charles S. Peirce",
title = "{Lecture I [R]. MS [R] 449}",
year = 1903,
abstract = "{Robin Catalogue: A. MS., notebook, G-1903-2a, pp. 37-61. Published, in part, as 1.611-615 and 8.176 (except 176n3) (pp. 37-49 and 51-53). Unpublished: criticism of Sigwart and the notion of “logisches Gefühl.” Logic embraces methodeutic, critic, and the doctrine of signs (speculative grammar), with the ultimate purpose of the logician being the working out of a theory regarding the advancement of knowledge. Speculative grammar is neither psychology nor epistemology. Erkenntnislehre is mainly metaphysics. CSP agrees with those metaphysicians who insist that metaphysics must rest upon logic. Essential Peirce, vol. 2: Composed at the end of the summer 1903 and delivered on 23 November 1903, this is the first of eight lectures Peirce gave at the Lowell Institute in Boston under the general title “Some Topics of Logic bearing on Questions now Vexed. ‘1 In this lecture, Peirce refutes “a malady” that “has broken out in science,” namely the idea then in vogue that rationality rests on a feeling of logicality, and that it is futile to try to find an objective distinction between good and bad reasoning. On the contrary, Peirce claims, that distinction is not at all a matter of what we approve of, but is a question of fact. Good reasoning is based on a method that “tends to carry us toward the truth more speedily than we could otherwise progress.” Peirce discusses the significance of even a slight tendency to guess correctly, arguing that, given the right method, that is all that is required to assure progress toward the truth. He continues the argument, just made in the Harvard Lectures, that reasoning is a form of controlled conduct, and thus has an ethical dimension. Peirce concludes with a discussion of the scope of logic, which he now equates with semiotics as a whole. }",
keywords = "Right Reasoning, Ultimate Aim, Ideal, Reason, Feeling of Logicality, Growth, Victoria Lady Welby, Meaning, Grades of Meaning, Methodeutic, Advancement of Knowledge, Critic, Logic, Epistemology, Speculative Grammar, Quasi-sign, Hardness",
language = "English",
note = "From the Commens Bibliography | \url{http://www.commens.org/bibliography/manuscript/peirce-charles-s-1903-lecture-i-r-ms-r-449}"
}

Quotes

Commens Dictionary entries from ‘Lecture I [R]’

Critic
1903 \| MS [R] 449:56, EP 2:256 [Methodeutic] is not possible until the logician has first examined all the different elementary modes of getting at truth and especially all the different classes of arguments and has studied their properties so far as these properties concern power of the arguments as leading to the truth. This part of logic is called Critic.	preview

Logic
1903 \| MS [R] 449:55, EP 2:256 The ultimate purpose of the logician is to make out the theory of how knowledge is advanced.	preview

Methodeutic
1903 \| MS [R] 449:56, EP 2:256 …Methodeutic, which is the last goal of logical study[,] is the theory of the advancement of knowledge of all kinds.	preview

Reason
1903 \| MS [R] 449:45, EP 2:255 The very being of the General, of Reason, consists in its governing individual events. So, then, the essence of Reason is such that its being never can have been completely perfected. It always must be in a state of incipiency, of growth.	preview

Speculative Grammar
1903 \| MS [R] 449:59-61, EP 2:257 I [….] take a position quite to that of the English logicians, beginning with Scotus himself, in regarding this introductory part of logic as nothing but an analysis of what kinds of signs are absolutely essential to the embodiment of thought. I call it, after Scotus, Speculative Grammar. I fully agree, however, with a portion of the English school, – a school I may observe which now has a large and most influential and scientific following in Germany, – I agree, I say, with a portion of this school without thereby coming into positive conflict with the others, in thinking that this Speculative Grammar ought not to confine its studies to those conventional signs of which language is composed, but that it will do well to widen its field of view so as to take into consideration also kinds of signs which, not being conventional, are not of the nature of language. In fact, as a point of theory, I am of opinion that we ought not to limit ourselves to signs but ought to take account of certain objects more or less analogous to signs. In practice, however, I have paid little attention to these quasi-signs.	preview

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Lecture I [R]