@article{Boyd+Heney2017,
author = "Kenneth Boyd and Diana Heney",
title = "{Rascals, triflers, and pragmatists: developing a Peircean account of assertion}",
year = 2017,
journal = "British Journal for the History of Philosophy",
volume = 25,
number = "2",
pages = "287-308",
issn = "09608788",
abstract = "{While the topic of assertion has recently received a fresh wave of interest from Peirce scholars, to this point no systematic account of Peirce’s view of assertion has been attempted. We think that this is a lacuna that ought to be filled. Doing so will help make better sense of Peirce’s pragmatism; further, what is hidden amongst various fragments is a robust pragmatist theory of assertion with unique characteristics that may have significant contemporary value. Here we aim to uncover this theory, and to show that assertion for Peirce is not a mere corollary of pragmatic conceptions of truth, judgement, and belief, but is rather a central aspect of his philosophy.}",
keywords = "Assertion",
language = "English",
note = "From the Commens Bibliography | \url{http://www.commens.org/bibliography/journal_article/boyd-kenneth-heney-diana-2017-rascals-triflers-and-pragmatists}"
}
