PapersTable of Contents
The subject of this communication is Peirce’s ideas about abduction which is just one step in his larger scheme of evidence- based hypothetico-deductive epistemology. Since Peirce repeatedly changed his mind, the aim is to construct a “definitive Peirce” on this particular subject. A short list of quotations from the large corpus of Peirce was assembled (some 440 items extracted from 122 bibliographic units have been documented) and this annotated bibliography was used to interpret Peirce’s intentions. Several stages in the development of his ideas can be demarcated. A classification of his late life into a methodological stage (logic of discovery), and a noetic stage (psychology of discovery) is confirmed. Peirce gives up on applying syllogistic inference to abduction in preference of Socratic interrogations, but this development is overlaid by ever increasing emphasis on a guessing instinct. Peirce’s contradictions are best rendered as tetralemma; like fibers in a rope extending in time and not unicursal stages. His ideas about creativity turn from historical (breaking new ground) to psychological (ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny) and reveal much of his personality and health. Peirce’s epistemology is compared with that of Popper, who was a nominalist. My study also sheds light on a number of related issues: Peirce anticipates Rupert Sheldrake’s theory of morphic fields, whereas he was still unaware of chaos theory. Nor did he recognize that behind instinctual guidance some inference via 2nd order variations is at work. The status and reality of hypothetical entities will be discussed briefly. In spite of Peirce’s emphasis on evidence, verisimilitude remains to be negotiated.
Along with being a visual method of scientific investigation in its own right, the process of composite photography was often invoked, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, as a powerful philosophical metaphor. I investigate an early chapter in the life of this metaphor: its reception and use by the American philosopher, logician and scientist Charles S. Peirce. I show how Peirce’s use of composite photography was rooted in his sophisticated understanding of the composite process itself, which had been originally developed by Sir Francis Galton in the late 1870s. I highlight substantial differences in the ways Peirce and Galton drew on the composite process to advance broader epistemological claims - especially claims concerning the nature and reliability of scientific generalisations. I argue that Peirce and Galton’s respective approaches to the issue of generalisation and generality condense deeper epistemological tensions that deserve renewed philosophical consideration. I conclude by arguing that the material dimension of photography as a mode of representation in its own right, and in particular the limitations of the photographic process as an ‘objective’ mode of representation, were ultimately of crucial importance for the ways in which Peirce adopted and articulated the metaphor of composite photography in his philosophical works.
This paper takes indexicality as a case-study for critical examination of the distinction between semantics and pragmatics as currently conceived in mainstream philosophy of language. Both a ‘pre-indexical’ and ‘post-indexical’ analytic formal semantics are examined and found wanting, and instead an argument is mounted for a ‘properly pragmatist pragmatics’, according to which we do not work out what signs mean in some abstract overall sense and then work out to what use they are being put; rather, we must understand to what use signs are being put in order to work out what they mean.
A paper presented at the Charles S. Peirce International Centennial Congress 2014. Invigorating Philosophy for the 21st Century. Lowell, USA, 16-19 July.
In this paper interplay between Peircean abduction and modern literature on methodology is analyzed. Abduction is used in methodological discussions on qualitative methods, for example, in relation to grounded theory, case study methodology, and ethnography. Basic uses of abduction in this literature are presented. They provide a perspective on abduction treated dynamically besides more traditional outlooks on abduction as specific reasoning steps or as a first phase in methodology. Abduction gives especially means of seeing the role of theorizing and the interaction between theories and observations in methodology. A list of abductive strategies (seven in all) are presented which are in line with a dynamic view on abduction. Peirce provides elements for this kind of an interpretation even though methodeutic was the vaguest and the least developed area of his theory of logic.
This presentation pays homage to all the major figures who, from the time Josiah Royce saved the Peirce papers from oblivion by getting them shipped to his Harvard office, gave years or decades of their lives to the organization, selection, editing, and publications of Peirce’s writings. The presentation also brings into relief the gradual development and increased sophistication of the methods used in reconstituting and editing Peirce’s texts, up to the present day, with an overview of the work accomplished by the Peirce Edition Project and a preview of the production platform the Project has been developing recently.
Presented at the Charles S. Peirce International Centennial Congress on July 18, 2014.
This poster, displayed at the The Charles S. Peirce International Centennial Congress (University of Massachusetts Lowell, 2014), presents the key features of the new Digital Companion version of Commens, launched in 2014.
This memorandum documents some of the most noteworthy facts concerning the Metaphysical Club meetings, which were predominantly presided over by Charles Peirce, and which took place at Johns Hopkins University from October 1879 until March 1885. The Club held the total of 43 meetings, and 110 presentations, of which 33 were principal papers. These facts, some of which are highlighted in the document that follows, testify that the club had an enormous impact on the development of American sciences and methodology.
Peirce’s “sop to Cerberus” - the inclusion of a human ingredient in the general conception of the sign - has mostly been interpreted as a momentary lapse. Peirce certainly regretted the need for such a compromised account; and many Peircean semioticians have also contended that a satisfactory theory of the sign must be strictly formal, derivable from a few basic relational principles. This seems to suggest a top-down approach, giving precedence to abstract ideas over concrete semiotic experience. However, a closer study of Peirce’s efforts reveals a far more intricate story, connected to the question of the basic character and motivation of his project. Without denying that Peirce’s ultimate aim was a non-anthropocentric theory of signs, the aim of this talk (originally presented in 2007) was to outline how Peirce may have succeeded in having his cake and eating it too – that is, how he could accommodate the view that the signs of the world must be initially grasped in terms of human (anthropomorphic) semiotic experience and yet be able to plausibly develop a general (non-anthropocentric) conception of the sign.