Latest Quotes Added to the Commens Dictionary

…a leading principle, which contains no fact not implied or observable in the premisses, is termed a logical principle, and the argument it governs is termed a complete, in contradistinction to an incomplete, argument, or enthymeme.

…a leading principle, which contains no fact not implied or observable in the premisses, is termed a logical principle, and the argument it governs is termed a complete, in contradistinction to an incomplete, argument, or enthymeme.

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We may here distinguish between logical and extralogical validity; the former being that of a complete, the latter that of an incomplete argument.

The term logical leading principle we may take to mean the principle which must be supposed true in order to sustain the logical validity of any argument. Such a principle states that among all the states of things which can be supposed without conflict with logical principles, those in which the premiss of the argument would be true would also be cases of the truth of the conclusion. Nothing more than this would be relevant to the logical leading...

…a leading principle, which contains no fact not implied or observable in the premisses, is termed a logical principle, and the argument it governs is termed a complete, in contradistinction to an incomplete, argument, or enthymeme.

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A logical principle is said to be an empty or merely formal proposition, because it can add nothing to the premisses of the argument it governs, although it is relevant...

…every argument has, as portion of its leading principle, a certain principle which cannot be eliminated from its leading principle. Such a principle may be termed a logical principle.

An argument whose leading principle contains nothing which can be eliminated is termed a complete, in opposition to an incomplete, rhetorical, or enthymematic argument.

Since it can never be requisite that a fact stated...

A purely contentless principle. As a logical principle should be.

…a leading principle of maximum abstractness may be termed a logical principle.

…the essence of law consists in its being a conditional truth about the indefinite future, and never can become matter of actual fact. Or we may say it is such a truth that upon the knowledge of it a perpetual or indefinitely lasting conditional expectation may be founded. We say “indefinitely lasting” because as a general rule our laws are vaguely understood to endure only so long as “the present state of things” continues; but that state of things may endure...

Another case is where a sign fully interpreted in its definition, the very creation of the new sign, not now bringing about an actual event, as with the dicisign, but merely imparting to the definition a certain capacity, or contingent power, that of being properly applied to designate whatever the definitum may designate. A sign whose whole purport can be so interpreted or conveyed is termed a rheme.

..there are signs that both can be and have to be interpreted in an appropriate act and deed, in order that their peculiar purport may be conveyed. Let a man write his name on a scrap of paper, and it means nothing; but let him affix it to a legal instrument or affidavit, and it asserts. Such an assertive sign is technically named a dicisign.