The Commens Dictionary

Quote from ‘Syllabus: Syllabus of a course of Lectures at the Lowell Institute beginning 1903, Nov. 23. On Some Topics of Logic’


Among the familiar ideas of logic in which the element of Secondness is predominant, may be mentioned, in the first place, the conception of a fact. The easiest definition of a Fact is that it is an abstract element of the real, corresponding to a proposition. But this needlessly introduces the element of Thirdness; but it can be prescinded from it. … A Fact may be defined as the Secondness which consists between anything and a possibility, or Firstness, realized in that thing.

EP 2:270-271
‘Fact’ (pub. 04.06.14-20:23). Quote in M. Bergman & S. Paavola (Eds.), The Commens Dictionary: Peirce's Terms in His Own Words. New Edition. Retrieved from
Jun 04, 2014, 20:23 by Sami Paavola
Last revised: 
Aug 22, 2015, 17:45 by Mats Bergman