The Commens Dictionary

Quote from ‘On Signs [R]’


Logic, in its general sense, is, as I believe I have shown, only another name for semiotic (σημειωτική), the quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of signs. By describing the doctrine as “quasi-necessary,” or formal, I mean that we observe the characters of such signs as we know, and from such an observation, by a process which I will not object to naming Abstraction, we are led to statements, eminently fallible, and therefore in one sense by no means necessary, as to what must be the characters of all signs used by a “scientific” intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable of learning by experience.

1897 [c.]
CP 2.227
‘Semeiotic’ (pub. 19.08.13-18:34). Quote in M. Bergman & S. Paavola (Eds.), The Commens Dictionary: Peirce's Terms in His Own Words. New Edition. Retrieved from
Aug 19, 2013, 18:34 by Sami Paavola
Last revised: 
Nov 19, 2015, 19:26 by Mats Bergman