The Commens Dictionary

Quote from ‘Division III. Substantial Study of Logic. Chapter VI. The Essence of Reasoning’


The terms, substantial necessity and substantial possibility […] refer to supposed information of the present in the present, including among the objects known all existing laws as well as special facts. In this sense, everything in the present which is possible is also necessary, and there is no present contingent. But we may suppose there are “future contingents.” Many men are so cocksure that necessity governs everything that they deny that there is anything substantially contingent. But it will be shown in the course of this treatise that they are unwarrantably confident, that wanting omniscience we ought to presume there may be things substantially contingent, and further that there is overwhelming evidence that such things there are.

1893-1895 [c.]
MS [R] 409:107-108; CP 4.67
‘Substantial Necessity’ (pub. 06.03.18-16:46). Quote in M. Bergman & S. Paavola (Eds.), The Commens Dictionary: Peirce's Terms in His Own Words. New Edition. Retrieved from
Mar 06, 2018, 16:46 by Mats Bergman