The Commens Dictionary

Quote from ‘The Basis of Pragmaticism’


The contents of most logic books is a syncretistic hodgepodge, and it is difficult to detect any differences but those of detail between one book and another. It is certain, however, that there have been, and still are, many logicians who in regard to our more primary and simple thoughts would protest against the theory that they have any exterior meaning. “The meaning!” these logicians would exclaim, “That is precisely the concept!” The refutation of this opinion will make us pragmatists, according to my analysis. In order to establish pragmaticism, it will be necessary further to show that if the ultimate interpretation of a thought relates to anything but a determination of conditional conduct, it cannot be of an intellectual quality and so is not in the strictest sense a concept.

1905 [c.]
MS [R] 908:3-4; EP 2:361-362
‘Pragmaticism’ (pub. 12.03.18-12:44). Quote in M. Bergman & S. Paavola (Eds.), The Commens Dictionary: Peirce's Terms in His Own Words. New Edition. Retrieved from
Mar 12, 2018, 12:44 by Mats Bergman
Last revised: 
Mar 12, 2018, 12:45 by Mats Bergman