Bibliography

Notes on Portions of Hume's "Treatise on Human Nature"

As an example of Being conceived as consisting in the acting of its subject upon other objects, we have Actuality.

In their relations to their Triadic, i.e. intended or adaptational Interpretants, Signs may, 1^st, determine those interpretants, merely in the sense that, if the Interpretants represent the Objects as the Signs themselves do they are such Interpretants as are intended. Such is an ideal statuette, and exclamation of surprise, a noun, whether common or proper. 2^nd, Signs may be adapted to compelling or tending to compel the determination of their intended interpretants, such is a portrait with the name of the person represented under it, such is a weather-cock in a good breeze. 3^rd, Signs may be adapted to determining a particular interpretant logically. Names: Rheme, Dicisign, Argument.

The function of logic, in its critical part, is to criticize the connection between premisses and conclusions.

In their relations to their Triadic, i.e. intended or adaptational Interpretants, Signs may, 1^st, determine those interpretants, merely in the sense that, if the Interpretants represent the Objects as the Signs themselves do they are such Interpretants as are intended. Such is an ideal statuette, and exclamation of surprise, a noun, whether common or proper. 2^nd, Signs may be adapted to compelling or tending to compel the determination of their intended interpretants, such is a portrait with the name of the person represented under it, such is a weather-cock in a good breeze. 3^rd, Signs may be adapted to determining a particular interpretant logically. Names: Rheme, Dicisign, Argument.

…the division of signs according to their Monadic Objects is simply into 1^st, Signs of Objects whose Being is Monadic (signs of qualities, etc), 2^nd, Signs of Objects whose Being is Dyadic (signs of existents, past events, etc), 3^rd, Signs of Objects whose Being is Triadic (Signs of Laws, Types, etc.). Names: Monadosemeion, Dyadosemeion, Triadosemeion.

A habit is the general way in which one would act if such and such a general kind of occasion were to occur. To say it really explains anything is to make a general real, and knock the pins from under every nominalistic philosophy.

In their relation to their Dyadic Objects, Signs are, 1^st, those which refer to their objects by virtue of their independent possession of some character of those objects, as a figure of a triangle used in a geometrical demonstration represents any triangle, because it has three rectilinear sides, which it would have, just the same, even if it were not considered as a sign and if there were no other possible triangle in the world for it to represent; 2^nd, those signs which refer to their objects by virtue of being really related to them in existence, as a thermometer is a sign of the temperature of its environment; 3^rd, those signs which refer to their objects not as resembling them, nor as being in fact actually connected with them, but simply by virtue of the circumstance that they will be interpreted as referring to those objects. I term these three kinds, Icon, Index, Symbol.

In their relation to their Dyadic Objects, Signs are, 1^st, those which refer to their objects by virtue of their independent possession of some character of those objects, as a figure of a triangle used in a geometrical demonstration represents any triangle, because it has three rectilinear sides, which it would have, just the same, even if it were not considered as a sign and if there were no other possible triangle in the world for it to represent; 2^nd, those signs which refer to their objects by virtue of being really related to them in existence, as a thermometer is a sign of the temperature of its environment; 3^rd, those signs which refer to their objects not as resembling them, nor as being in fact actually connected with them, but simply by virtue of the circumstance that they will be interpreted as referring to those objects. I term these three kinds, Icon, Index, Symbol.

The individual, strictly speaking, is that of which every possible predicate is either true or false.

…the division of signs according to their Monadic Objects is simply into 1^st, Signs of Objects whose Being is Monadic (signs of qualities, etc), 2^nd, Signs of Objects whose Being is Dyadic (signs of existents, past events, etc), 3^rd, Signs of Objects whose Being is Triadic (Signs of Laws, Types, etc.). Names: Monadosemeion, Dyadosemeion, Triadosemeion.

The first cognition which we can recognize is a percept. Different people are different; but to me a percept is very much like a moving picture, accompanied by sounds and other sensations. I am also conscious of its being there in spite of me, so that I resist it, that is a sort of inertia tending to object to surprise is overcome in perceiving. It is there by brute force.

…I note a great difference between a “percept” and a “perceptual judgment”. The latter is a mental description of a percept, in language or other symbols. [—] But the elements of the perceptual judgments correspond to no separate elements of the percepts. The judgments “represent” the percepts only in the sense that the future self will interpret them as representing the percepts.That is why I call them symbols; for by a symbol I mean a sign which represents its object only by virtue of the fact that it will be interpreted as doing so.

What I call Reasoning differs from an acritical inference in that it is always accompanied by the belief that it, the special inference, is only an instance of a type, or genus of inference. I do not agree with Hume that the line should be drawn between cases where the “check or controul” actually is resorted to. It suffices that the mind should appeal to the possibility of such confirmation, just as the moral difference between lawful and lawless action consists, not in the case being carried into court, but in the agent’s confidence that a court would sustain him. In my opinion, reasoning is only a peculiar variety of action under moral self-control. As in the case of morals, the control may be of a very complex kind; but its essential features are review, critical comparison with previous decisions or with ideals, rehearsal in the imagination of future conduct on various possible occasions, and the formation or modification thereby of habits or dispositions of the occult something behind consciousness. The great stimulus to reasoning is surprise.

In their relations to their Triadic, i.e. intended or adaptational Interpretants, Signs may, 1^st, determine those interpretants, merely in the sense that, if the Interpretants represent the Objects as the Signs themselves do they are such Interpretants as are intended. Such is an ideal statuette, and exclamation of surprise, a noun, whether common or proper. 2^nd, Signs may be adapted to compelling or tending to compel the determination of their intended interpretants, such is a portrait with the name of the person represented under it, such is a weather-cock in a good breeze. 3^rd, Signs may be adapted to determining a particular interpretant logically. Names: Rheme, Dicisign, Argument.

The scholastic realist says, “[…] there are real laws (or necessities,) and real possibilities. They are not actual: they do not exist: but they are not figments. They are such as they are whether you and I think them to be so, or not. The future does not exist. But it is really true that if I find the air in my study stuffy, I can open the window.”

It is difficult to define a sign in general. It is something which is in such a relation to an object that it determines, or might determine, another sign of the same object. This is true but considered as a definition it would involve a vicious circle, since it does not say what is meant by the interpretant being a “sign” of the same object. However, this much is clear; that a sign has essentially two correlates, its Object and its possible Interpretant sign. Of these three, Sign, Object, Interpretant, the Sign as being the very thing under consideration is Monadic, the Object is Dyadic, and the Interpretant is Triadic. We therefore look to see, whether there be not two Objects and three Interpretants. There obviously are two Objects, the object as it is in itself (the Monadic Object), and the object as the sign represents it to be (the Dyadic Object). There are also three Interpretants; namely, 1^st, the Interpretant considered as an independent sign of the Object, 2^nd, the Interpretant as it is as a fact determined by the Sign to be, and 3^rd the Interpretant as it is intended by, or is represented in, the Sign to be.

…by a symbol I mean a sign which represents its object only by virtue of the fact that it will be interpreted as doing so.

In their relation to their Dyadic Objects, Signs are, 1^st, those which refer to their objects by virtue of their independent possession of some character of those objects, as a figure of a triangle used in a geometrical demonstration represents any triangle, because it has three rectilinear sides, which it would have, just the same, even if it were not considered as a sign and if there were no other possible triangle in the world for it to represent; 2^nd, those signs which refer to their objects by virtue of being really related to them in existence, as a thermometer is a sign of the temperature of its environment; 3^rd, those signs which refer to their objects not as resembling them, nor as being in fact actually connected with them, but simply by virtue of the circumstance that they will be interpreted as referring to those objects. I term these three kinds, Icon, Index, Symbol. [—] [A] Symbol can only be a Legisign. It cannot be either a Qualisign or a Sinsign. For a Symbol is founded on a general convention, general habit, or general disposition to interpret it in a certain way. Now this general convention, habit, or disposition can only refer to a general description of sign.

Our thought is in my opinion […] an appeal in symbols of the self of the present to the self of the immediate future. It is conducted, if not in propositions, in something very much of that nature. I do not think it is, in its movement, propositional; but we are continually drawing up propositions or “judgments” to formulate it. The propositions are an interpretation of the thought, and the thought is partly an interpretation of the percept.

…the division of signs according to their Monadic Objects is simply into 1^st, Signs of Objects whose Being is Monadic (signs of qualities, etc), 2^nd, Signs of Objects whose Being is Dyadic (signs of existents, past events, etc), 3^rd, Signs of Objects whose Being is Triadic (Signs of Laws, Types, etc.). Names: Monadosemeion, Dyadosemeion, Triadosemeion.