Bibliography

Materials for Monist Article: The Consequences of Pragmaticism. Vols. I and II [R]

Doubt is a state of mind characterized by a feeling of uneasiness. Nevertheless, we cannot from a logical, and especially from a pragmaticistical point of view, regard the doubt as consisting in feeling. [—] A true doubt is […] a doubt which really interferes with the proper action of a belief-habit.

…What quality of anything is it that is fine in itself without any ulterior reason? Then the problem of ethics being the study of the general conditions for making the fine existent, it is quite plausible in advance that this may depend upon what the fine is. But it is a part of the solution of that problem that the chief agency for the actualization of the fine must be the action of self-control. As soon, therefore, as we come to see Reasoning, the primary, and indeed the principal, subject of logic, is precisely self-controlled thought, the applicability to it of ethical theory becomes credible, to say the least.

An external object is anything that is not affected by any of man’s cognitions (whether about it or about anything else) to whom it is external.

A first intention, so called, is not a direct intention to act, nor even a direct attention to such intention. It is thought in symbols, as for example language; and language is itself thought about thought, this latter thought not being generally direct thought of action.

…hypostatic abstraction, the act of metamorphosing a predicate or verb-idea into a subject (or grammatical object which is a secondary subject.)

A real is anything that is not affected by men’s cognitions about it.

A real is anything that is not affected by men’s cognitions about it. An external object is anything that is not affected by any of man’s cognitions (whether about it or about anything else) to whom it is external. Exaggerate this, and you have the conception of what is not affected by any human cognitions. Take the converse of this definition, and you have the definition of the Ding an sich, as that which does not affect human cognition.