Bibliography

That Categorical and Hypothetical Propositions are one in essence, with some connected matters

In every assertion we may distinguish a speaker and a listener. The latter, it is true, need have only a problematical existence, as when during a shipwreck an account of the accident is sealed in a bottle and thrown upon the water. The problematical “listener” may be within the same person as the “speaker”; as when we mentally register a judgment, to be remembered later. If there be any act of judgment independent of any registry, and if it have any logical significance (which is disputable), we may say that in that case the listener becomes identical with the speaker.

The assertion consists in the furnishing of evidence by the speaker to the listener that the speaker believes something, that is, finds a certain idea to be definitively compulsory on a certain occasion. There ought, therefore, to be three parts in every assertion, a sign of the occasion of the compulsion, a sign of the enforced idea, and a sign evidential of the compulsion affecting the speaker in so far as he identifies himself with the scientific intelligence.

The logical and hemilogical relations belong to the old class of relations of reason, while relations in re are alogical. But there are a few not unimportant relations of reason which are likewise alogical. In my paper of 1867, I committed the error of identifying those relations constituted by non-relative characters with relations of equiparance, that is, with necessarily mutual relations, and the dynamical relations with relations of disquiparance, or possibly non-mutual relations. Subsequently, falling out of one error into another, I identified the two classes respectively with relations of reason and relations in re.

The logical and hemilogical relations belong to the old class of relations of reason, while relations in re are alogical. But there are a few not unimportant relations of reason which are likewise alogical. In my paper of 1867, I committed the error of identifying those relations constituted by non-relative characters with relations of equiparance, that is, with necessarily mutual relations, and the dynamical relations with relations of disquiparance, or possibly non-mutual relations. Subsequently, falling out of one error into another, I identified the two classes respectively with relations of reason and relations in re.

A representation is that character of a thing by virtue of which, for the production of a certain mental effect, it may stand in place of another thing. The thing having this character I term a representamen, the mental effect, or thought, its interpretant, the thing for which it stands, its object.

There are […] observations which are not only open to all men; but which are necessarily open to all intelligences capable of acquiring scientific, imperfect knowledge from observation and reasoning. The science which is base on such observations as these may suitably be called philosophy. This science will be somewhat narrower than what is commonly called philosophy, since it will exclude ethics, esthetics, etc. which repose on observations which might be foreign to some kind of scientific mind. This science of philosophy, although it is observational, yet will have, in a certain sense, a necessary character; for it is based exclusively on such observations as must be open to every scientific intelligence.

Every subject, when it is directly indicated, as humanity and mortality are, is singular. Otherwise, a precept, which may be called its quantifier, prescribes how it is to be chosen out of a collection, called its universe. In probable logic, the quantifiers – such as “nine out of ten,” and the like – refer to an experiential course or “long run.” But in necessary logic there is no reference to such a course of experience, and only two quantifiers are required; the universal quantifier, which allows any object, no matter what, to be chosen from the universe, and the particular quantifier, which prescribes that a suitable object must be chosen. When there are several quantified subjects, and when quantifications are different, the order in which they are chosen is material. It is the character of the quantifier of the last chosen subject which extends itself to the whole proposition.

By logical relations, I mean those in respect to which all pairs [of] objects in the universe are alike; by hemilogical relations those in respect to which there is in reference to each object in the universe only one object (perhaps itself) or some definite multitude of objects which are different from others; while the alogical relations include all other cases. The logical and hemilogical relations belong to the old class of relations of reason, while relations in re are alogical. But there are a few not unimportant relations of reason which are likewise alogical. In my paper of 1867, I committed the error of identifying those relations constituted by non-relative characters with relations of equiparance, that is, with necessarily mutual relations, and the dynamical relations with relations of disquiparance, or possibly non-mutual relations. Subsequently, falling out of one error into another, I identified the two classes respectively with relations of reason and relations in re.

By logical relations, I mean those in respect to which all pairs [of] objects in the universe are alike; by hemilogical relations those in respect to which there is in reference to each object in the universe only one object (perhaps itself) or some definite multitude of objects which are different from others; while the alogical relations include all other cases. The logical and hemilogical relations belong to the old class of relations of reason, while relations in re are alogical. But there are a few not unimportant relations of reason which are likewise alogical. In my paper of 1867, I committed the error of identifying those relations constituted by non-relative characters with relations of equiparance, that is, with necessarily mutual relations, and the dynamical relations with relations of disquiparance, or possibly non-mutual relations. Subsequently, falling out of one error into another, I identified the two classes respectively with relations of reason and relations in re.

A representation is that character of a thing by virtue of which, for the production of a certain mental effect, it may stand in place of another thing. The thing having this character I term a representamen, the mental effect, or thought, its interpretant, the thing for which it stands, its object.