First Intention

1867 | On a New List of Categories | W 2:56; CP 1.559

...second intentions are the objects of the understanding considered as representations, and the first intentions to which they apply are the objects of those representations.

1873 | Chap. XI. On Logical Breadth and Depth | W 3:98

The first intention is the mental act by which an object is conceived.

1893 | Book II. Division I. Part 2. Logic of Relatives. Chapter XII. The Algebra of Relatives | MS [R] 418:359-60

The scholastic doctors used to talk of *first intentions* and *second intentions*. First intentions were conceptions obtained by generalizing ordinary experiences. Second intentions were conception[s] obtained by generalizing conceptions themselves considered as objects of logical comparison.

1896 | The Regenerated Logic | CP 3.433

The sort of idea which an icon embodies, if it be such that it can convey any positive information, being applicable to some things but not to others, is called a *first intention*. The idea embodied by an icon which cannot of itself convey any information, being applicable to everything or to nothing, but which may, nevertheless, be useful in modifying other icons, is called a *second intention*.

1902 | Intention | DPP 2:561; CP 2.548

First intentions are those concepts which are derived by comparing percepts, such as ordinary concepts of classes, relations, etc.

1905 | Materials for Monist Article: The Consequences of Pragmaticism. Vols. I and II [R] | MS [R] 288:33

A first intention, so called, is not a direct intention to act, nor even a direct attention to such intention. It is thought in symbols, as for example language; and language is itself thought about thought, this latter thought not being generally direct thought of action.

...the characteristic of an object may be conceived to reside in itself. As such it is a *Quale*; and the conception of it is called a *First Intention*.