

'Collateral Observation' (pub. 13.10.15-16:30). Quote in M. Bergman & S. Paavola (Eds.), *The Commens Dictionary: Peirce's Terms in His Own Words. New Edition*. Retrieved from <http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-pragmatism-33>.

Term: Collateral Observation

Quote: ...merely producing a mental effect is not sufficient to constitute an object a sign; for a thunder-clap or avalanche may do that without conveying any meaning at all. In order that a thing may be a true sign, its proper significate mental effect must be *conveyed* from another object which the sign is concerned in indicating and which is by this conveyance the ultimate cause of the mental effect. In order to be the cause of an effect, – or *efficient cause*, as the old phrase was, – it must either be an existent thing or an actual event. Now such things are only known by observation. It cannot be itself any part of the mental effect, and therefore can only be known by collateral observation of the context or circumstances of utterance, or putting forth, of the sign.

Source: Peirce, C. S. (1907). *Pragmatism*. MS [R] 318.

References: EP 2:429

Date of 1907

Quote:

URL: <http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-pragmatism-33>