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Abstract: In his 1868 'Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man' and 'Some Consequences of Four Incapacities' Peirce famously rejected the possibility of having intuitions. He defined an intuition as 'a cognition not determined by a previous cognition of the same object' or as a 'premiss not itself a conclusion.' The rejection of intuitive knowledge can thus be seen as an expression of Peirce's enduring conviction that our knowledge is by nature inferential. Even though the main polemical target of these papers is surely Descartes, Peirce specifies in a footnote that he nearly uses the word intuitive 'as the opposite of discursive cognition,' and that this 'is also nearly the sense in which Kant uses it.' Peirce's position seems thus to be quite radical in his rejection of the Kantian distinction between intuitive and discursive cognition, between intuitions and concepts. I show that Peirce, despite this opposition to the Kantian distinction in his early writings, retained and developed in a totally new way some of its essential features in his mature semiotic. In fact, Peirce's famous distinction between icons, indices, and symbols can be read as having functions similar to those reserved by Kant for the distinction between intuitions and concepts. In this framework, the tasks that Kant attributed to intuitions are performed by indices and icons.

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